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NOTES AND COMMENTS

cies ;'0 and the economic pressures arising from the necessity of maintaining a large and steady "box-office," which means never seriously
offending any significant group or point of view.7 '
Although it is but a first step, the Miracle decision promises to do
much to bring the law of film censorship into phase with the ideal of
substantially complete freedom of expression from all prior restraints,
which has increasingly characterized the law of the United States.
JOHN L. SANDERS.

Costs-Attorney Fees as Costs in Taxpayers' Actions
The recent case of Homer v. Chamber of Commerce' involved a
taxpayer's action to recover, for the benefit of a municipality, public
moneys which had been unlawfully disbursed.2 The court held that
"where, on refusal of municipal authorities to act, a taxpayer successfully prosecutes an action to recover, and does actually recover and
collect, funds of the municipality which had been expended wrongfully or misapplied, the court has implied power in the exercise" of a
sound discretion to make a reasonable allowance from the funds actually
extension of official censorship.

INGLIS, FREEDOM OF THE MovIEs 87-96 et seq.
(1947). The M. P. A. embraces 95% of the producers, distributors, and exhibitors of the nation. Few theaters will rent films lacking the M. P. A. seal of
approval, which is borne by 95% of all films released in the United States. Hughes
Tool Co. v. Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 1006
(S. D. N. Y. 1946).
"0The National Board of Review, pioneer in the field of non-industry film
reviewing, was formed in 1909 with the encouragement of certain producers fearful of threatened government control. Working independently of the film industry, and with non-professional viewers, the Board operates in the public interest under the slogan, "Selection Not Censorship." It does not censor films, but
views and approves those films which in the opinion of the viewers are neither

violative of the obscenity statutes, detrimental to public morality, nor subversive

in effect upon the national audience, when evaluated as a whole. Its operations
are financed by fees charged producers for reviewing films submitted by them.
INGLIS, FREEDom OF THE MoviEs 74-82 (1947) ; 49 YALE L. J. 87, 108-109 (1939).
The National Legion of Decency was formed in 1933 at the instance of the
Catholic Bishops of the United States, and soon secured for itself a position of
great power. Acting as a reviewing agency, the Legion classifies films for the
information of all Catholics, a great many of whom take a periodic pledge to
respect the group's recommendations. In its "C" or "condemned for Catholics"
rating, the Legion holds a weapon the potency of which is much feared by producers. INGLIS, op. cit. supra at 120-125 (1947). See Kazan, Pressure Problem[;] Director Discusses Cuts Compelled in "A Streetcar Named Desire," in
EMERSON AND HABER, EDs., POLITICAL AND CIVrI RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES

722 (1952). There are also several other private organizations which review
films in the interest of their members and the public. See 60 YALE L. J. 696, 714
n. 40 (1951).
1

" ERNST, THE FIRST FREEDOm 202-203 (1946).

1236 N. C. 96, 72 S.E. 2d 21 (1952).
'See Horner v. Chamber of Commerce, 235 N. C. 77, 68 S.E. 2d 660 (1952);
Homer v. Chamber of Commerce, 231 N. C. 440, 57 S.E. 2d 789 (1950) (The
case was before the Supreme Court twice on appeal. The background facts
may be found in these decisions.)
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recovered to be used as compensation for the plaintiff taxpayer's attorney fees."-3
North Carolina has provided by statutory enactments that court
costs in certain types of actions shall include reasonable attorneys'
fees. 4 Outside of those instances covered by statute, the court has been
very restrictive in allowing recovery of such fees as costs,5 the theory
being that counsel fees are matters to be settled between attorney and
client; thereby precluding the courts from being called on to settle
such matters. 6
However, in the principal case the court recognizes the broad doctrine that "while ordinarily attorney fees are taxable as costs only
when expressly authorized by statute, nevertheless, the rule is well
established that a court of equity, or a court in the exercise of equitable
jurisdiction, may in its discretion, and without statutory authorization,
order an allowance for attorney fees to a litigant who at his own expense has maintained a successful suit for the preservation, protection,
or increase of a common fund or of common property, or who has
created at his own ekpense or brought into court a fund which others
may share with him."7 In support of this doctrine the court cites those
North Carolina cases which have allowed recovery of attorney fees
'Horner v. Chamber of Commerce, 236 N. C. 96, 101, 72 S. E. 2d 21, 24

(1952).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21' (1943) provides that costs shall include reasonable
attorneys' fees in the following instances: (1) upon application for year's support for children or widow, (2) caveats to wills, (3) habeas cropus proceedings,
(4) action for divorce or alimony, (5) application for the establishment, alteration or discontinuance of public roads, cartways, or ferries, (6) the compensation of referees and commissioners to take deposition, (7) all costs and expenses incurred in special proceedings under the chapter entitled Partition, (8)
in all proceedings under the chapter entitled Drainage, except as therein otherwise
provided, and (9) in proceedings for the reallotment of Homestead. See A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina1936, 15 N. C. L. R. 333, 334 (1936).
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 19-8 (1943) provides that in any action brought to enjoin
certain acts against public morals the court shall tax as part of the costs such
fees for the attorney prosecuting the action as may in the court's discretion be
reasonable remuneration for the services performed by such attorney. N. C.
GEN. STAT. § 40-7 (1943 Recomp. 1950) provides that in Eminent Domain proceedings the court shall appoint some competent attorney to appear for and protect the rights of any party in interest who is unknown or whose residence is
unknown or who has not appeared in the proceedings by an attorney or agent,
and shall make an allowance to the said attorney for his services, which shall
be taxed as costs.
See Trust Co. v. Schneider, 235 N. C. 446, 70 S. E. 2d 578 (1952); In re
Will of M. T. Howell, 204 N. C. 437, 168 S.E. 671 (1933) (now contra by N. C.
GEr.STAT. § 6-21 (1943) ; Ragan v. Ragan, 186 N. C. 461, 119 S.E. 882 (1923) ;
Byrd & Bryan v. Georgia Casualty Co., 184 N. C. 224, 114 S.E. 1 (1922) ; City
of Durham v. Davis, 171 N. C. 305, 88 S.E. 433 (1916); Mordical v. Devereux,
74 N. C. 673 (1876).
Erickson v. Starling, 235 N. C. 643, 71 S. E. 2d 384 (1952); Mordecal v.
Devereux, supra note 5.
'Homer v. Chamber of Commerce, 236 N. C. 96, 97, 72 S. E. 2d 21, 22
(1952).
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incurred by fiduciaries or persons appointed by the courts respecting
litigation involving either the creation or protection of the funds or
property of their trust estates or wards.8 That is, without statutory
authorization, North Carolina has consistently allowed recovery of
counsel fees by administrators, 9 trustees,' next friends of infants,"
and receivers' 2 on the theory that attorney fees incurred in creating or
protecting estates are proper administrative expenses. 13 However,
none of these cases in which such allowances have been deemed proper
deal with a situation whereby a member of a group has maintained an
action for the benefit of himself and other members of the group. Instead, they deal only with situations in which trustees or persons of
similar position have protected or recovered funds or property of their
trust estates in which they have no personal interest or from which
they will derive no personal benefit. It is conceded that a taxpayer
suing on behalf of himself and other taxpayers stands in what might
be recognized as a position of trust, but those North Carolina cases
which have allowed recovery of counsel fees have dealt only with express trusts. Therefore, it appears that North Carolina has given
recognition to a new doctrine which allows counsel fees to a litigant
who, at his own expense, has maintained a successful action to recover
or preserve funds or property in which others may share with him.
A review of decisions from other jurisdictions indicates that this
doctrine has been widely accepted, and counsel fees allowed without
the aid of statutory authority.' 4 In addition to having been applied
to taxpayers' actions similar to the one in the principal case,' 5 it has
been applied to numerous other situations, including action by legatees
' Patrick v. Branch Bank & Trust Co., 216 N. C. 525, 5 S. E. 2d 724 (1939)
(by implication); Hood v. Cheshire, 211 N. C. 103, 189 S. E. 189 (1937) ; In re
Stone, 176 N. C. 336, 97 S. E. 216 (1918) ; Graham v. Carr, 133 N. C.449, 45 S. E.
847 (1903) ; Overman v. Lanier, 157 N. C. 544, 73 S. E. 192 (1911) (by implication) ; Kelly v. Odum, 139 N. C. 278, 51 S. E. 953 (1905) (by implication); Gay
v. Davis, 107 N. C. 269, 12 S. E. 194 (1890). ' Overman v. Lanier, supra note 8 (by implication).
10 Patrick v. Bank & Trust Co., 216 N. C. 525, 5 S. E. 2d 724 (1939)
(by
implication); Hood v. Cheshire, 211 N. C. 103, 189 S. E. 189 (1939) ; Kelly v.
Odum,
139 N. C. 278, 51 S. E. 953 (1905) (by implication).
1 1n re Stone, 176 N. C. 336,
97 S. E. 216 (1918).
12 Graham v. Carr, 133 N. C. 449, 45 S. E. 847 (1903).
Gay v. Davis, 107 N. C. 269, 12 S. E. 194 (1890).
"4See Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U. S. 527 (1881); Buford v. Tobacco
Growers Co-op Ass'n, 42 F. 2d 791 (4th Cir. 1930) ; Marine Cooks' & Stewards'
Ass'n v. Weber, 93 Cal. 2d 327, 208 P. 2d 1009 (1949); Winslow v. Harold G.
Ferguson Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 724, 153 P. 2d 714 (1944) ; In re Linch's Estate, 139
Neb. 761, 298 N. W. 697 (1941) ; Johnson v. Williams, 196 S. C. 528, 14 S. E.
2d 21' (1941). For compilation of cases see Note, 49 A. L. R. 1150 (1927).
15 Russell v. Tate, 52 Ark. 541, 13 S. W. 130 (1890) ; Universal Construction
Co. v. Gore ....
Fla..
51 So. 2d 429 (1951); Tenny v. City of Miami
Beach, 152 Fla. 126, 11 So. 2d 188 (1942) ; Kimble v. Board of Comm'rs of Franklin County, 32 Ind. App. 377, 66 N. E. 1023 (1903) ; Shillito v. City of Spartanburg, 214 S. C. 11, 51 S. E. 2d 95 (1948).
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under a will;1° action by bondholders to preserve a bond fund ;17 action
by beneficiaries of a trust estate to recover funds of the estate ;18 and
action by members of a labor union to restore funds to the benefit of
the union and its members.' 9
Since North Carolina has given recognition to this broad doctrine,
will it follow the lead of other jurisdictions and apply the doctrine to
situations other than taxpayers' actions? The answer is clearly uncertain. The court in the principal case expresses no inclination to
have its decision embrace cases other than taxpayers' actions; however,
this does not affect the real significance of the case. The mere recognition of a doctrine which allows recovery of counsel fees as costs
without statutory authorization indicates a tendency by the court to relax its heretofore strict attitude against such allowances. It is suggested
that this tendency be extended so as to allow recovery of counsel fees
as costs in situations other than taxpayers' actions where substantial
justice requires such allowances; thereby bringing North Carolina into
accord with other jurisdictions.
ERVIN I. BAER.
Covenants--Building Restrictions-Violation of a Restriction
Against the Erection of a Duplex
Defendants owned a lot subject to the following restrictions contained in the deed: "Said property shall be used only for residential
purposes with the understanding that no duplex or apartment house
be erected thereon, and shall not be used for cemetery, hospital, sanitorium, or any business purposes." The house upon the lot, as originally
constructed, was not a duplex and was used as a single-family residence.
Subsequently, defendants installed a second kitchen in a basement playroom, rented out three rooms and bath (the newly created kitchen included) to another family, and occupied the balance of the house as
their own home. Plaintiffs, who owned lots in the same division,
subject to the same restrictions, brought an action to enforce the
restrictions in defendants' deed, alleging that defendants' house, as
converted, constituted a duplex in violation of said covenant. At the
close of plaintiffs' evidence defendants' motion for a nonsuit was granted
by the Superior Court on the ground that the evidence failed to show
the construction of a duplex. Affirming this judgment, the Supreme
Court of Georgia held that the conversion of a playroom into a second
"Johnson v. Williams, 196 S. C. 528, 14 S. E. 2d 21 (1941).
"Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U. S. 527 (1881).
"IIn re Linch's Estate, 139 Neb. 761, 298 N. W. 697 (1941).
" Marine Cooks' & Stewards' Ass'n v. Weber, 93 Cal. 2d 327, 208 P. 2d 1009
(1949).

